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DGKD:Distributed Group Key Distribution with Authentication Capability
Pratima Adusumilli, Xukai Zou, Byrav Ramamurthy
Abstract- Group key management (GKM} is the most important issue i n secure group communication (SCC). The existing G K M
protocols fall rnto three typical classes: centralized group key distribution (CGKD), decentralized group k e y management (DGKM),and
distributed/contributory group key agreement (CGKA). Serious p r o b l e m s remains in these protocols, as they require existence of central
trusted entrties (such as group controller or subgroup controllers),
relayrng of messages (by subgroup controllers), or s t ~ c member
t
synchronization (JOT multiple round stepwise key agreement), thus suffering from the single point of failure and attack, perfonnance bottleneck, o r misoperations in the situation of transmission delay or
network failure. In thrs paper, we propose a new class of GKM protocols: distnbuted group key distribution ( D G K D ) . The new DGKD
protocol solves the above problems and surpasses the ezisting G K M
protocols Z R terms of simplicity, eficien.cy, scalabdity, and robustness.
Keywords: Secure Group Communicatian, Group Key
Management, Centralized Key Distribution, (Distributed)
Contributory Key Agreement, Distributed K e y Distribu-

tion.

I. INTRODUCTION

(GC)) that js responsible for generating and distributing
the group key. Whenever a new member joins or an existing member leaves, the GC generates a new group key and
distributes the new key to the group. The problems with
the centralized schemes are the central point of failure, performance bottleneck, non-scalability, and the requirement
of trustworthiness of the group controller by all members.
In DGKM schemes [IO], 1111, [12], (131, the group is divided into multiple distinct subgroups and every subgroup
has a subgroup controller (SC) responsible for key management for its subgroup. In addition, an SC has the key
of its parental subgroup. When an SC receives a message
from one subgroup, it decrypts the message, encrypts the
message with the key of the other subgroup and sends to
the other subgroup, i.e., relaying the message. The problems with DGKM are that SCs can still be considered as
central and trusted entities (at a smaller scale) and the
messages undergo multiple relaying before they reach the
entire group. Relaying of every data message puts huge
burden on SCs. In CGKA schemes [14], [14], 1151, [16], [17],
[18],the group key is generated/agreed up by uniform contributions from all group members. These kind of schemes
assume equality and uniform work load among group members. They are generally executed in multiple rounds and
require strict synchronization. The CGKA protocols are
primarily different variations of the n-party Diffie-Hellman
key agreement/exchange 1141, [IS], [19], [20], [17],[18].The
main problem with using this key exchange mechanism is
t hat the group members need synchronization to iteratively
form parental keys from their two children’s keys. Once one
member is slow or one rekeying packet is delayed, the key
agreement process will be postponed or even misoperates.
Moreover, there are dependances among nodes’ keys (i.e.,
a blinded node key is dependent on the secret node key and
a parental key on its two child’s keys). This dependance
results in the breaking of all ancestral keys once one key is
compromised.

Secure group communications (SGC) over networks (e.g,
the Internet} refers to a setting in which a group of members can send messages to and receive messages from group
members, in a way that outsiders are unable t o glean any
information even when they are able to intercept the messages. SGC is an inseparable component of cyber security.
Broad critical applications such as collaborative work, teleconferencing/medicine, multi-partner military action, and
cyher forensics in critical fields depend on SGC for their
security.
The most important problem facing SGC is group key
management (GKM). The primary difficulty for GKM
comes from member dynamics. How to design robust,
scatabIe, efficient GKM protocols supporting high dynamics is the focus of all SGC researches. Many GKM prctocols have appeared in the literature and typically fall
into three categories: centralized group key distribution
(CGKD), decentralized group key management with relaying (DGKM), and (distributed) contributory group key
To overcome the above problems we propose a new class
agreement (CGKA).
of GKM protocols: called distributed group key distribu~n CGKD schemes PI, PI, 131, PI, 151, 161, 171, PIl PI1
there is a central trusted authority (called group controller tion (DGKD). The DGKD protocol does not assume any
trusted and more powerful third party but allows the equalThis work was partially supported by the U . S . NSF grant CCR- ity of capability, responsibility, and trustiness among all
0311577.
group members. The protocol organizes the members in a
P. Adusumili and X . Zou: School of Science, Purdue University at
tree structure and performs any rekeying operation in just
Indianapolis, Indianapolis, IN.
two rounds, which do not need to be strictly synchronized.
3.Ramamurthy: University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE.
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The new protocol also allows strong yct simple authentication. In addition, DGKD has the following advantages: (1)
one kcy (not two keys) per node; (2) iridependance of nodes’
keys; (3) robust against transmission delay, network failure
or compromise of node keys. All these properties make the
new protocol simple, robust, efficient and scalable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
I1 briefly describes the related work in the area of SGC.
We propose the new protocol in Section I11 and the issues
of performance and security are discussed in Section IV.
Finally we conclude the paper in Section V.

111. D l S T R I 3 U T E D GROUPKEY DISTRIBUTION
(DGKD): A NEW CLASS OF GKM PROTOCOLS

A . Principle and assumption
There are some assumptions in existing schemes.

In

CGKD/DGKM, a secure channel is assumed to exist between the GC/SC and each of the potential group members/subgroup members. This secure channel is generally implemented by public key cryptosystems. In CGKA,

which is typically based Diffte-Hellman key exchange which
suffers from the Man-in-the-Middle attack, it is assumed
that each group member is equipped with some authentication capability which is also implemented by public key
cryptosystems. SimiIarly, DGKD assumes that every group
11. RELATED
WORK
member has a publicly known (unforgeable) public key.
The new DGKD protocol adopts a tree structure and utiExtensive rcsearch has been conducted on GKM and a lizes three basic mechanisms to implement distributed key
considcrable number of protocots have been developed 1211, generation and distribution: 1) the leaf key of a node is
1221, 1231,1241,1251,1261,1271,
1281,
1141,131, 1301, 1311~the public key of the corresponding group member and all
1151, 1101, 1321, 1331, 141, 151, [ W , 1341, [351, 1361, 1371, 1381, the intermediate nodes’ keys are secret keys, 2) the spon1121, 171, 1391, 1401, 1411, 1171, [1811 1421, 1431, 1441, 191, 1451, sor of a joining or leaving member initiates the key geneach with different properties and performance.
eration and rekeying process and sends the new keys to
SGC applications can typically be divided into broad- co-distributors (i,e., the first round), 3) the co-distributors
cast/muIticost communication, i.e., one sender and mul- then help distribute the new keys t o group members in a
tiple receivers, or o n e - t o - m a n y communication and group distributed/parallel manner (i.e., the second round).
All group members have the same capability and are
(or many-to-many) communication, i.e., every sender also
being a receiver. Some G K M schemes 1211, 1461, [15],l l O ] , equally trusted. Also, they have equal responsibility, i.e.
1111, 1131 arc suitable for broadcast applications, some other any group member could be a potential sponsor of other
schemes 1281, [14], [15], 1161, 1411, 1171, [I81 for many-to- members or a co-distributor (depending on the relative lu
many applications, arid there are also some schemes [3], cations of the member and the joining/leaving members
[12], [7], [9] suitable for both kinds of apptications. Based in the tree). Thus there is no dependance on a single enon how the group key is fornicd and distributed, the GKM tity and even if a sponsor node fails a new sponsor for the
protocols are classified as CGKD, DGKM, and CGKA. joining/leaving member is chosen by other members. This
Based on the kind of cryptosystem used, the schemes for improves the robustness of the protocol.
SGC can be divided into public-key based schemes 1461,
IllJ, [13]and secret-key based schemes. Based on the kind B. Sponsor
of seciirity, the SGC schcmes may be classified as unconA sponsor is a member and the sponsor of a subtree is
ditionally secure or computationally secure 1471, 1431. Fur- defined as the member hosted on the rightmost leaf in the
thermore some schemes may resist against any number of subtree (note: “rightmost” can be equally replaced with
colluding adversaries, whereas others 1221, 1231, 124, [25], “leftmost”). Every node has an associated sponsor field as
1261, [27], 1321, 1431 only resist against the collusion of up shown in Figure 1.
to certain number of adversaries. For a comprehensive surThe sponsor field at a particular node is updated when
vey of state-of-art techniques and challenging problems in it is along the joining or leaving member’s path. We show
the area of SGC, readers are referred to the book “secure the joining algorithm for updating the sponsor field in Figgroup communications over data networks”, which is pub- ures 2.
lished by Springer 1481.
When a member joins, the sponsor field along the joining
Among all the GKM protocols, the tree based GKM members path is updated from bottom to the root. If the
schenie (with various variants) [l],[2], [3],[49], [19], IS], new members id is greater than the sponsor id of the node
[7], 1411, 181, [9], [50], 1511 is the most typical approach. then update the sponsor id with the new member’s id. This
The schenie is simple, efficient, scalable, and casy to im- is continued until the root (See Figure 3).
plenicnt. The sdienie can be used for both one-to-many
When m7 joins, the sponsor field along its path is upmulticast cornrtiunication ;as well as many-to-many group dated. The sponsor id of the node k6--7 is lesser than the
cornmunication. Moreover the tree hascd G K M schcme has id ofm7, so it is updated t o 111. Similarly the sponsor id’s
versions of both CGKD and CCKR.
of nodes k4-7 and k0-7 are updated to 111. Whenever the

wit
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New Mcmbcr

Fig. 1. A tree showing sponsor for each node.

Fig. 3. Updating the sponsor field when a member joins

Every member

.iterate over all the nodes along the joining
members path from leaf to the root
.if the joining members id is greater t h an the
sponsor id for th at node
sponsor id joining members id
.continue
. else
.break

Sid= 110

Fig. 2. Sponsor update: Join
Fig. 4. Updating a sponsor field when a member leaves.

sponsor id for a node is greater than the joining members
id then the check can be stopped.
When a member leaves, every member checks along the
path of the leaving member t o update the sponsor field. If
a node has the leaving member as the sponsor then they
update the sponsor field with the sponsor id/member id of
the other child if exists. This continues upto the root (See
Figure 4).
When m7 leaves, the sponsor field along its path is updated. Since the leaving member is the sponsor all along
its path, the sponsor field has to be updated by checking
for the new sponsor for all the nodes. m6 becomes the new
sponsor for node ks--7. For node k4--7 the member ids of
both its children are compared and the greater becomes
the new sponsor, in this case m6. This continues until the
root.

C. Co-distributors
When a sponsor changes the keys along the path, i t needs
to distribute them. The sponsor has to distribute the keys
to all the members whose keys have been changed. But
it does not know the keys along the other paths to distribute the new keys. So, a cc-distributor is required to distribute them. The cedistributor is the sponsor of a node
on another path whose key is not known to the original
sponsor. The sponsor encrypts the changed key with the
co-distributors public key and broadcasts this information.
0-7803-9290-6/05/$20.00 02005 IEEE.

Thus, the co-distributor helps the sponsor in distributing
the changed common keys along the other paths.
D. Initial group key generation and distribution Protocol
Suppose n members m l , ......,mrr decide to form a group.
They build a virtual key tree and selects a sponsor to decide an order in which they join the tree. Every member
updates the key tree by adding members in the key tree
based on that order and they update the sponsor field in
all the intermediate nodes. Then every member checks if it
is responsible for generating any keys along its path. If so,
it generates them and distributes the keys either directly
or with the help of co-distributors. When two sponsors are
responsible for generating the same key then the rightmost
among them generates it. As more members join the key
tree the sponsors and the height of the key tree increase.
As illustrated in Figure 5, 7727, 7715, m3 and m l are responsible for generating the keys. m7 generates all the keys
( k6-7, k 4 - 7 and k0-7 ) along its path to the root. Then it
encrypts as follows and broadcasts: {k6-71 k 4 - 7 , k 0 - - 7 } ~ k ~ ,
and { k D - - 7 , k 4 - 7 } p k s . m5 will decrypt k0-7 and k4--7 and
encrypt it as Ik0-7, k4-7}k4--5 where k ~ + is generated by
m5 and sent to m 4 . Similarly keys are generated by m3
in the left subtree along its path and the root key which
is generated by the rightmost sponsor m7 is sent to the
co-distributor of the left subtree m3 as follows. { I c 0 - 7 } ~ 1 ; ~
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becomes the sponsor and generates the new keys along its
path and distributes them. Members update the sponsor
field appropriately if required. Figure 6 describes the join
protocol and Figure 7 shows the protocol operation when
a new member joins.

Co-Cisrbu/..\,

......... .....

Fig. 5. Initial key generation Example

is broadcast and m3 will decrypt kO-y and encrypts it as
{ k ~ - 7 } k ~and
- ~ broadcasts it. Thus every member has the
newly generated keys along its path. Only two rounds
are required for this protocol, one round for generating
keys and distributing along the path and another for codistributors to distribute them.

E. Join protocol
Step 1: New member broadcasts request for join
. mn+l (PKn+l)=. ml ,->mrl

Step 2: Every meniber
. updates the key tree by adding a new member node
. Find sponsor for joining member:
. jf sibling present, sponsor = sibling
. else sponsor = m,+l
. update the sponsor field along the path of the joining
member to the root if required
Step 3: If joining member’s sponsor is itself
. generates new secret keys along the joining members path
and distribute them to co-distributors and to other memberr
directly by encrypting with common key and broadcasting
Step 4: If cc-distributor is itself
encrypt the key sent by the joining members sponsor with
appropriate key and broadcast
I

I

I

and

m7

m4

is sponsor and

m3

are cedistributors.

When a new member joins, m7 determines the position(i.e., ms) and places the member there. m7 broadcwts the position of the new member to other members.
All members also determine that m4 is the sponsor of m5.
So m4 initiates the rekeying process as follows: 1) generates new keys k;-51
and k;l-7. 2) after determining
the cedistributors m3 and “7, encrypts as follows and
broadcasts: {ki-7r k & - 7 } p k 7 , and { k h - 7 } p k 3 , 3 ) . m3 will
decrypt k;l-7 and encrypt it as {kh-7}ko-a and m7 will decrypt k:--7 and kAm7 and encrypt them as { k i - 7 } k 6 - , and
{kb-7}k4-7r4). m4 also encrypts and sends the keys to m5
as { k i - 5 , k i - , , k h - 7 } p k 6 . As a result, all the members will
get the new keys.
When a new member joins, only the keys along its path
to the root have to be changed and distributed, which can
be achieved in two rounds with atmost logzn keys being
changed.

F. Leave protocol

Fig. 6. Join Protocol.

Suppose there are TZ members in the group m l ,,.....,m,.
A new member m,+l makes a join request by broadcasting
its public key PK. The rightmost member in the key tree
authenticates the new member, decides the insertion location for the new member and broadcasts this information
to other members. Additionally the rightmost member also
sends the virtual key tree and list of public keys of other
members to the new member. All other members update
the key tree by adding a new member node in the specified
location. Then every member checks to see if it is the sponsor of the joining member. If the new member has a sibling
it becomes the sponsor and generates new keys along the
path.. If there is no sibling then the joining member itself
0-7803-9290-6/05/$20.00 02005 IEEE.

Fig. 7. A new member joins (becomes ms),

Step 1: Every member
updates the key tree by removing the leaving member node
. updates the sponsor field appropriately along the leaving
members path if required
. determines the sponsor for changing keys along the leaving
members path
Step 2: If sponsor of the leaving member is itself
. generates new secret keys along the path and distributes
them to co-distributors and directly to other members
Step 3: If cc-distributor is itself
. broadcasts the key sent by the leaving members sponsor by
encrypting it with the appropriate key
L

28 9

Fig. 8. Leave Protocol.
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Assume that member ml leaves the group. Every member updates the key tree by deleting node ml and updates
the sponsor field along the path if required. Then they
determine the sponsor who generates new keys along the
leaving members path and distributes them. If the leaving member does not have a sibling then the first sponsor
along the leaving members path becomes responsible for
changing the keys along the leaving member’s path (See
Figure 8).

Step 1: Every member
. updates key tree by adding new member nodes
. updates the sponsor field along all the paths of the
joining members
. computes the keys that need to be changed
. determines the sponsors who are responsible for changing
these keys
Step 2: If sponsor for one of the joining members is itself
. changes the secret keys dong the joining members path
and distributes them to co-distributors and directly
to other members
. if same key has to be changed, check if right sponsor is itse
. if rightmost sponsor, change the key and distribute
Step 3: If co-distributor is itself
. broadcasts the key sent by the joining members sponsor by
encrypting it with the appropriate key

Fig. 10. Multiple Join Protocol.

._’

Sponsor

conferencing scheme called KTDC in [52] which uses an efficient algorithm for computing the shared keys. There will
be multiple sponsors responsible for changing the necessary
keys. But here the shared keys which both sponsors have in
common and which need to be changed will be changed by
the rightmost sponsor among the sponsors (See Figure 10).

5

Fig. 9. A member mg leaves.

As shown in Figure 9, when a member m5 leaves, all the
members will remove the node and determine that m4 is
the sponsor of m5. So m4 initiates the rekeying process as
follows: 1) generates new keys kk--5, k i m r ,and kb-,. 2) after determining the co-distributors m3 and m7, encrypts as
follows and broadcasts:
and { k ; J - T } p k 3 3).
,
m3 will decrypt kb-7 and encrypt it as { k ; ) - 7 } k o - 3and m7
will decrypt kkT7 and khP7 and encrypt them as {ki-7}ks-7
and {kb--7}k4-7, 4). As a result, all the members will get
the new keys.
When a memher leaves only the keys along its path to
the root have to be changed and distributed, which can
be achieved in two rounds with a t most lognn keys being
changed.
U. Multzple j o i n protocol
Suppose m new members join, they make a join request
by broadcasting their public keys. The rightmost member
i n the key tree authenticates the new members, decides the
locations for all the new members such that minimal numher of keys are changed and broadcasts this information
to other existing group members. The rightmost member
also sends the virtual key tree and existing members public
keys to the joining members. Every member upon receiving this message updates its key tree by adding m new
nodes in the determined positions. In order to perform
niultiple joins in one aggregate operation, it is required t o
find the common keys shared by the joining members in an
efficient way. To achieve that we use an already proposed
scheme, an efficient and scalable key tree based dynamic

0-7803-9290-6/051$20.00 02005 IEEE.

Fig. 11. New members mo, m l ,

m4

and mg join.

As shown in Figure 11, when new members join, m 7 will
determine the available positions (Le., ma, m l , m4, m5)
and place the members there. m7 broadcasts this information to other group members. Ail members also know
that m5 is the sponsor of m4 and ml is the sponsor of
mo. They also know that m3 and m7 are responsible for
sending the key tree structure and the public key list to
the joining members. m5 initiates the rekeying process as
and khm7. 2) affollows: 1) generates new keys k&-,,
ter determining the co-distributors m3 and m7, encrypts as
follows and broadcasts: { k i - 7 , I C ; ] - 7 } p k 7 , and {kh--T}pk3, 3 ) .
m3 will decrypt kbP7 and encrypt it as { k h - - 7 } k ; - 3 and m7
will decrypt ki.-7 and kb-7 and encrypt them as { k i - 7 } k s - 7
and { k & - 7 ) k 4 - 7 , 4). m5 also encrypts and sends the keys to
m4 as { k i p s ,k i - 7 , kh--l}pkd.
Similarly ml regenerates the
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keys along its path except for the root key which should be
changed by the rightmost sponsor 7125. Both m1 and m5 do
these operations in parallel. As a result, all the members
whose keys have been changed will get the new keys,
Since all the operations are done in parallel, rekeying can
be achieved in two rounds by all the sponsors.
When a network event causes all the previously occurred
partitions to reconnect this is called a merge. Mctge is
similar to multiple join and this can also be achieved in
two rounds which is better than that in TGDH.

If. Multiple leave protocol

In case of a network failure which causes disconnectivity,
the group gets split and this partition can be dealt with as
a multiple leave operation. Thus, even for network partition the protocol requires only two rounds for regenerating
and distributing the keys. This is a great improvement
compared to TGDH which requires several rounds.

Step 1: Every member
. updates the key tree by removing all leaving member nodes
. updates the sponsor field along all the leaving members
paths if required
. determines th e sponsors responsible for changing the keys
along the paths
Step 2: If sponsor for one of the leaving member is itself
. generates new secret keys and drstributes them to
co-distributors and other members directly
. if same key has t o be changed, check if right sponsor is itse
. if rightmost sponsor, change the key and distribute
Step 3: If c-distributor is itself
broadcasts th e key sent by the leaving members sponsor by
encrypting it with the common key

I. Authentication in DGKD

Fig. 12 Multiple Leave Protocol

When multiple members leave, every member updates its
key tree by deleting those member nodes and the sponsor
fields along all the paths. Then they determine t h e keys
that need to he changed and thc sponsors responsible for
changing those keys. There will he multiple sponsors and
each sponsor regenerates the keys and distributes them.
If two sponsors are responsible for changing the same key
then the rightmost among the sponsors will change the key
(See Figure 12).
,.

II

r

deleting those member nodes. Every member also determines that 1713 and m7 are the sponsors. 7717 initiates the
rekeying process as follows: 1) generates new keys
and kh-7. 2 ) encrypts the new keys as follows and broadcasts: {ki.-7j k t ) - 7 } k s - , , and { k h - 7 } p k 3 , 3) m3 will decrypt
kL-7 and encrypt it as { k ; ) - 7 } k ~ - - and
3
broadcasts it. Similarly 7713 generates the keys k& and encrypts it with k2-3
and broadcasts it. Both m3 and m.7 do these operations
in parallel. As a result, all the members whose keys have
been changed will get the new keys.

Most CGKA protocols do not contain an authentication component. Furthermore, the authenticated CGKA
protocols [53], [54],[ 5 5 ] , [56], (571 are non-scalable and/or
non-dynamic. In contrast, the new DGKD protocol is not
only scalable and dynamic but also able to provide easy
and strong authentication. Consider two scenarios: (1) the
sponsor m4 transmits a new key kh-7 to a cedistributor
m3. (2) m3 transmits the key kt)-i to members m0,ml,m2
who are in the responsibility scope of m3. In the first case,
m4 signs the key kh-,(using mq’s private key), encrypts
both kb-7 and the signed kb-,(using m3’s public key pka),
and sends the result to 7723. 7723 after receiving the message,
decrypts k;l-7 and then verifies m4’s signature. In the second case, m3 signs k;-,(by its private key), encrypts both
kt)-i and the signed kkp7(using koP3 which covers mo to
m3). Then each of the members from mo to m2 can verify
m3’s signature.

IV. DISCUSSIONS

.I

.

Fig. 13. hlernbers mo>m l ,

m4

and ms leave

As shown in Figure 13, when several rnenibers mo, m l ,
m4 and m5 leave, every member updates its key tree by

0-7803-9290-6~05/$20.0002005 IEEE.
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We discuss the performance and security of our protocol
in this section and analyze the communication and computation costs for join, leave, multiple join and multiple leave
operations. Tree based Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) [19],
j34J is one of the most typical CGKA protocols in terms
of efficiency and scalability, so we focus on the coniparison
between DGKD and TGDH.
Key generation is independent, i.e., only the sponsor is
involved, thus there is no need for synchronization with
other members which is required in TGDH. In this sense,
DGKD is more resilient to network congestion, delay and
failure than TGDH. DGKD also has strong yet simple authentication. It is also collusion free because the new keys
are independent of the old keys and no matter how many
members collude they cannot get the keys. Thus, it is
unconditionally secure. Both TGDH and DGKD require
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two rounds for single join and leave operations. As for
multiple join and leaving operations, DGKD requires two
rounds but TGDH requires log(p) rounds where p is the
number of members involved. DGKD uses public key encryption for sending the keys to co-distributors and secret
key encryption for further distribution of keys (from the codistributors to the members). TGDH requires performing
modular exponentiations which is in the same complexity
as the public key encryption. In summary, DGKD is comparable and in some cases better than TGDH in terms of
communication and computation costs.

V. CONCLUSION
We proposed a new class of GKM protocols for SGC with
strong yet simple authentication capability. The proposed
protocol solves some serious problems in the existing prctocols and is simple, robust, efficient, and scalable. The
future work is to implement and test the new protocol.
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